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Harold Marsh Sewall, the “ truculent'* consul general at Apia, Samoa, was a member
of Maine’s premier shipbuilding and shipping family. As such, he understood the
connection between a strong American presence in the Pacific and the health of the
nation's shipping and commerce. His vigorous pursuit of American interests in
Samoa, however, cost him his position at the end of the Cleveland administration.
Maine Mini time Museum photo courtesy o f the author.

HAROLD MARSH SEWALL
AND THE TRUCULENT PURSUIT
OF EMPIRE: SAMOA, 1887-1890
B y Pa u l T. B u r l in

The conflict between Thomas F. Bayard, Grover Cleveland's first Sec
retary of State, and his subordinate, Harold Marsh Sewall of Bath,
Maine, who was U.S. consul general to Samoa, was not a disagree
ment about the goals of American policy. Their disagreement related
more to tactical considerations. And at that level, generational differ
ences probably drove them apart. Specifically, the meaning of the
Civil War for the younger generation of which Sewall was a part may
well have contributed to his “truculent" pursuit of empire, a posture
that totally unnerved the older Bayard. Paul T. Burlin is Associate
Professor of History and Chair of the Department of History and
Politics at the University of New England. He is currently working on
a book that traces the nineteenth-century connections between
Maine and the Pacific. He recently returned from Brazil where he
taught U.S. history at the University of Sao Paulo as a Fulbright
scholar. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the World Af
fairs Council of Maine

one month from the time he was to leave office himself as a
result o f Grover Cleveland's loss o f the 1888 presidential election,
Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard dismissed Harold Marsh
Sewall from his post as consul general to Apia, Samoa. Sewall, a member
of a prominent Maine family, had taken the position at Apia with the
conviction that America's prosperity depended on global trade connec
tions, and these in turn depended on a strong diplomatic presence in
crucial places like Samoa. His conviction, derived from his family's long
history in shipbuilding and shipping, was consistent with the nation's
growing involvement in global imperial politics in the second half o f the
century. Thus his summary dismissal in 1889 is something of an enigma.1
In fact, the dismissal climaxed a year o f conflict between the young con
sular representative and the State Department. Exploring the sources o f
this tension sheds light on the crosscurrents of values and beliefs that
u st
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shaped the American Empire during the late nineteenth century, includ
ing the long shadow of the Civil War, which seemed constantly to be in
Sewalls way.
Sewall was a native of Bath, a vibrant, seafaring city near the mouth
of the Kennebec River. Born in i860, he grew up amidst the towering
masts of the huge vessels built by his family’s famous shipyard— some o f
the largest square rigged sailing ships ever to carry the American flag. In
such an environment, Sewall came to appreciate the importance o f trade
and commerce in maintaining the strength o f the American Republic.
If ships and the sea were one influence on the young Sewall, another was
the Democratic party. Harold’s father, Arthur, was a prominent leader in
the party, serving several times as a member o f the Democratic
National Committee. In 1896, he became William Jennings Bryan’s
vice presidential running mate. Like his father, Harold Sewall was a
Democrat.2
After graduating from Bath High School, Harold Sewall attended
Harvard College and Law School. He was fortunate to graduate when
Democrat Grover Cleveland was president, and through his father’s
political influence, he was appointed vice consul at Liverpool, England,
in 1885. His tenure at Liverpool was uneventful. Since the city was a
major port of call for the Sewall ships, however, he spent a considerable
amount o f time facilitating family business. Very ambitious, Sewall
aggressively sought a promotion, and he was appointed consul general
to Apia, Samoa, in early 1887.3 Samoa was not a frequent port of call for
Sewall ships. Nevertheless, the Pacific was familiar to the Sewalls, as the
bulk of their tonnage was involved in deep-water voyages from San
Francisco around Cape Horn to the East Coast o f the United States or to
Europe. As the last decade o f the nineteenth century approached, the
Sewall vessels gravitated to the Hawaiian sugar trade, carrying the raw
product to refineries in the United States.4
By the time of Sewall’s appointment to Apia, Americans and Euro
peans had been in Samoa for approximately fifty years. In the late 1870s,
with the United States taking the lead, each of the three major foreign
powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, signed formal
treaties with Samoa. The American treaty granted the United States the
right to establish a coal yard at the typhoon-proof harbor at Pago Pago
on Tutuila. Another article of the treaty provided that the United States
would, if requested by Samoa, exercise its “good offices” were the islands
threatened by a third power.5
While there had always been a certain uneasiness between the for-
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rign powers in Samoa, the situation deteriorated drastically in 1884,
when Germany forced the Samoans to sign a new agreement which, if
enforced, would have essentially placed the islands under its exclusive
control. Thomas Bayard, Grover Cleveland s first Secretary o f State
(1885-1889), protested this move, but shortly thereafter, the Germans
granted recognition to the rebel chieftain, Tuapa Tamasese, in defiance
of the established king, Malietoa Laupepa, whom the United States sup
ported. Acting on his own responsibility, U.S. Consul Berthold
Greenebaum declared an American protectorate over the islands. Al
though Bayard disavowed GreenebaunTs action, and ultimately replaced
him with Sewall, the Secretary o f State also called for a three-power con
ference in Washington to resolve the troubled situation in Samoa.6
This was the situation when Sewall was appointed consul general.
Before leaving for the South Pacific, he met with the Secretary o f State.
Their conversation did not bode well for the future. Bayard had heard
that Sewall approved o f GreenebaunTs action in raising the American
flag over Samoa and cautioned that this “had created an unpleasant im
pression in his mind.” Nevertheless, Bayard stated that Samoa was im
portant to the United States, and he was opposed to any one power as
suming paramount control over the islands.7 When Sewall left for
Samoa, therefore, it was with the distinct impression that the adminis
tration in Washington would resist any attempt by another country to
assert exclusive control o f the island group. He traveled first to Hawaii
and from there wrote to his father about rising British influence and the
mediocre capabilities o f the American officials he met.8 He then pro
ceeded to his post.
Unbeknownst to Sewall, the Washington Conference was not going
well. It broke down over a major point of disagreement between the
United States and Germany, concerning the form of the Samoan govern
ment and the role o f the foreign powers in it. Germany and Great Britain
favored a system whereby one nation, Germany, exercised mandatory
authority in the islands. Bayard proposed a complicated arrangement
with key responsibilities divided among the three powers in order that
Germany not attain the upper hand. A few days after Sewall arrived in
Apia, Bayard adjourned the conference for a few months to allow each
nation to assess the stalemate.9
Sewall could not be kept informed about events in Washington on a
timely basis because o f the lack of a cable connection with Samoa. He
arrived with the understanding that Bayard would protect American and
Samoan interests at the conference and that the status quo would be re
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spected by all three treaty powers. A State Department communique in
structed him to advise Malietoa to refrain from taking military action
against Tamasese, since the political affairs of the islands were under dis
cussion at Washington. Confident as a result o f his earlier conversation
with Bayard, he beseeched the king not to take military action against
the German-backed faction lead by Tamasese.10 Sewall quickly con
cluded, however, that the Germans were a very serious threat to Ameri
can and Samoan interests. He wrote to Washington that “short as has
been my time here, it has brought me in contact with that confidence on
the part o f the Germans in their early acquisition o f these Islands.” "
Having extracted a promise from Malietoa that he would not fight
unless first attacked, Sewall watched the situation deteriorate. In midAugust, he reported that German warships were expected soon, and
their presence would encourage the rebels. Sewall confided to his father
his fears that Washington would “ back out of Samoa,” and resolved that
he would “ resign if the Germans are given these islands.” He added that
he had “written much and plainly to Washington. I expect some o f [the]

In Samoa, the United States supported Malietoa Laupepa (left). Rebel chieftain
Tuapa Tamasese (right) gained backing from the German government. Harold
Sewall, who had extracted a promise from Malietoa to avoid open warfare, watched
with alarm as the situation deteriorated.

Peabody-Essex Museum photo courtesy o f the author.
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subordinates there will take offense. Try and find out.” 12 Shortly there
after, Germany declared war on Malietoa and installed Tamasese as king.
Sewall informed Washington that he had issued a non-recognition
proclamation declaring his continued support for Malietoa. In addition,
Sewall intervened in a number of ways against the Germans, some o f
which were covert. In a long letter to his fiancee in Maine, Sewall ex
pressed his frustration with Washington. The State Department was
simply not assertive enough with the Germans. Although he was con
strained from declaring a protectorate, as Greenebaum had done, Sewall
advised the king not to pay the fine the Germans demanded of him.
With war declared, Malietoa in hiding, and German sentries posted
throughout Apia and in the vicinity o f the American consulate, Sewall
received a clandestine visit from the beleaguered king and some of his
followers. Sewall advised the king to flee into the interior and to ignore
the German demand to surrender.13
When the State Department received news of the declaration of war,
Bayard sent a communique to Sewall reserving to the United States all
rights in Samoa. The department had “received explicit assurances from
Germany” that Samoan independence would not be impaired. The com
munique also warned Sewall not to take sides in the dispute. Washington
indicated approval o f the non-recognition proclamation and congratu
lated Sewall on his “dignified and discreet” conduct in very trying cir
cumstances.14 From this point on, however, relations between Sewall and
the State Department became progressively more strained.
It is clear from the letters to his fiancee and his father that Sewall did
not believe the State Department was realistic in its assessment o f Ger
man motives in Samoa. Sewall continued to send urgent dispatches to
Washington to make clear his perspective. While Germany might give
assurances about respecting Samoan independence, its actions at Apia
and elsewhere in the islands belied this. The political control exercised
by Germany, Sewall felt, was only preliminary to the commercial su
premacy which he believed was the Germans5chief objective. Behind the
German government's support o f Tamasese was the hand of a German
commercial company, owner o f the largest copra plantations in Samoa.
Squeezed by British and American competitors, the company sought to
eliminate its rivals through currency manipulation and monopoly over
the copra supply. As Sewall pointed out, the Germans supplied arms to
the Samoans, and since the islanders had little money, the Germans took
mortgages on Samoan land and accepted payment exclusively in copra.
Thus they threatened to tie up the entire copra crop, preventing Ameri
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can trade with the islands.IS Sewall emphasized the great difference be
tween Germany's official statements to Washington and the actual oc
currences on the islands:
While war was declared against Malietoa personally it has been waged
against the whole people, and although he gave himself up over seven
weeks ago peace has not yet been announced to them.
As for
Samoan independence and neutrality it [sic] no longer exists. German
sailors guard the flag o f Tamasese, and the German Com m odore exer
cises as effective a protectorate over this Islands as he could if Germany
should openly extend one here.1*'

If this was not enough, the Tamasese government, at the behest o f the
Germans, began imposing new taxes on inhabitants o f the islands. Be
cause they lacked cash, Samoans either paid the taxes in copra or mort
gaged their land to the German commercial enterprise.17
With his frustration clearly showing, Sewall penned a strong per
sonal appeal to Bayard. He resolved, however, not to desert his post, “ for
I am the only defense the Samoans have now." He would counsel against

With strong German backing and little resistance from the United States, Tamasese,
shown here with some of his troops, was able to drive Malietoa from power.
Secretary of State Bayard warned Sewall not to lake sides in the dispute.
Peabody-Essex Museum photo eourtesy of the author:
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From the consulate office in Samoa, Sewall sent fevered dispatches to Secretary
ot State Bayard insisting on a more vigorous State Department posture.
Peabody-Essex Museum photo courtesy of the author.

opposing the Germans, but, as he informed his fiancee, “ I shall finally al
low them to fight as the last resort for then they will be heard. The trou
ble is that our people are ignorant o f the history of our relations with
these people. If they knew the truth they would feel as I do about it.” '1'
Sewall was equally frank in his letter to the Secretary o f State. Ac
knowledging their previous conversation, he insisted that Malietoa had
looked to the United States for sound and disinterested advice and had
listened when Sewall advised him against taking up arms. At the time,
according to Sewall, "the followers of Tamasese were depressed and dis
organized, and the Germans feared the collapse o f the insurrection be
fore the arrival o f their ships. Malietoa was eager for war, but at my
earnest personal solicitation . . . he promised me not to fight, and he kept
his word, but with what sad results to himself and his people.” 19 The re
sult was that Malietoa was in exile and his rival, Tamasese, was now king.
In a revealing aside, Sewall pleaded: “ I am sure, Mr. Bayard, that if you
could only understand the situation here, there would be little need o f
my appeal to you in behalf o f these people.” Over the next few months,
Sewall continued to send alarmed dispatches to the State Department.-’”
In early January 1888, Sewall received a response. Bayard claimed to
understand Sewall’s reaction to the “ ruthless aggression by Germany,”
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but he could not agree that Malietoa’s misfortunes stemmed from the
trust he placed in the United States. From Bayard’s point o f view, the
proximate cause of Malietoa’s trouble was an ill-advised effort to con
clude an alliance with Hawaii. This had aroused German suspicions and
emboldened Malietoa, who then behaved imprudently in his conflict
with the rebel forces. He also noted that Sewall had received a confiden
tial copy of the Washington Conference protocols; having read them, Se
wall should have been aware o f the secretary’s tenacious efforts to pro
tect Samoan interests. Directing his ire at Sewall personally, the secretary
asked: “ By what reasoning you suppose my power to be able to encom
pass these results: I am not informed.” German actions, Bayard indi
cated, violated no international law insofar as the United States was con
cerned, and to take up Sewall’s suggestion would constitute an act of
belligerence. He reminded his subordinate that the Executive Branch of
the United States government was not constitutionally empowered to
declare war and concluded by observing that Sewall would best serve his
country’s interests by exercising greater “self control.”21
Sewall responded in a dutiful, if somewhat qualified manner. Noting
that he was disappointed “ beyond measure” that the United States
would not interfere directly with the Germans, he would bear Bayard’s
words of caution in mind. However, he could not resist reasserting his
point of view:
I have feared that impressions unfavorable to the Samoans might re
sult from their ready submission to all that has been done against
them. Should such impressions stand in the way of their receiving ei
ther the sympathy or the help which they deserve, I beg to have it un
derstood that the fault, if fault there is, is mine. Having kept them from
fighting, when I believe [sic] this would have saved them from the sad
lot which is theirs, I have sought to make what reparation I could by
preserving peace, when war would only expose them to the terrible
odds now against them. Should the time come when in the opinion of
their friends they should act for themselves, there would be a rising of
United Samoa.22
Needless to say, Bayard did not take this characterization o f the situation
as an opening for action. Therefore, throughout his remaining months
in Samoa, Sewall continued to report on what he perceived as perfidious
German activities. In another private letter to Bayard, he went so far as
to call for the use o f force to protect American land titles. Noting again
that German policies were depriving Samoans of their land, he wrote:

Harold Marsh Sewall

103

“Cannot something be done for the Samoans themselves to save them
from such an exaction and from the loss of what little land is left to
them?” 23
Extremely frustrated, Sewall applied for leave and went to Washing
ton in the fall of 1888. The existing record is sketchy, but it is clear that he
attempted to influence policy on a number of different fronts. While
guarded in his public statements, Sewall was blatantly and publicly un
happy with current American policy. Hoping to influence policy in
Samoa before the presidential election, he met with several political
leaders, including George Handy Bates, who had been on a fact-finding
mission to Samoa in 1886. As he told his father, he believed a stronger
stand on Samoa would be helpful to the president in the election.24
After the November election, Sewall had an extended interview with
Bayard, who indicated that American policy was to treat the Samoans
humanely, to assist them with self-government, and above all to “neu
tralize the waters o f Samoa for the peaceful commerce o f the world ”
Given these guidelines, “the unjust and even cruel treatment of the
Samoans by the Germans” was not a “ causus belli for the United States.”
Further, the State Department had never issued instructions that “war
ranted [Sewall] in suggesting even that the United States were prepared
to interfere by force for the protection o f the Samoan King, or his prop
erty or that o f his people against the action of Germany.” To Bayard, the
question was whether the German government was doing anything that
directly interfered with American rights, specifically the right to trade or
conduct business with Samoa and rights at Pago Pago Harbor. Despite
being well aware that the German copra company was behind the un
rest, and that it had the tacit support o f the German government, the
secretary did not waver in his conviction that the United States had no
right to intervene. “We had no policy o f annexation or protectorate
whatever in Samoa or anywhere else outside of the United States.” 25
Soon after this meeting, Sewall decided to pursue a different tactic.
By now, Benjamin Harrison, a Republican, had been elected president.
Cleveland and Bayard were lame ducks. Sewall probably talked with
William P. Frye, Republican senator from Maine, and a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, because in December Frye called for a
Senate investigation o f American policy toward Samoa.26 As a result of
this resolution, Sewall was called to testify before a subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Frye, on three occa
sions in January 1889. Sewall opened by pointing out Samoa’s strategic
importance relative to American trade routes, indicating that the islands
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would become all the more important with the completion o f a canal
through Central America. Alluding to his conversations with Bayard, Sewall reasserted his claim that Germany should not assume control of
Samoa. He drove home his point about passing bad advice to Malietoa
when he dutifully restrained the king from fighting Tamasese’s forces by
saying: “I could not in any way better have served the German purpose
than by my mission that day.”27
It is clear from the testimony that the essence o f Sewall’s disagree
ment with the Cleveland administrations Samoan policy came down to
one issue. From Sewalls perspective, Bayard was looking for excuses not
to strike a more forceful posture. A case in point was the distinction Ba
yard made between actions taken by the German government and ac
tions taken by private German citizens. From SewalFs perspective, the
distinction was specious. As he stated repeatedly, it was a generally rec
ognized fact and a matter of some “notoriety” in the islands that the
German government sought to undermine the neutrality and independ
ence of Samoa, but worked through the subterfuge o f its private citi
zens.28
The young consul general could not countenance his superior’s
cautious and legalistic approach. So long as Germany did not interfere
with American treaty rights in Samoa, Bayard insisted, no basis existed
on which to take action. The secretary repeated that advice to Cleveland
at about the time of Sewall’s appearance on Capitol Hill. Even if Ger
many were to annex Samoa, the United States could only demand full
respect for treaty rights, something, he pointed out, Germany had al
ways expressed an intention to honor.29 Sewall pursued a very different
perspective: “ I think our interference, or a firmness on the part o f this
Governm ent. . . is the only way to protect the interests we have secured
through our treaty in Samoa.” Sewall’s testimony, coming in such con
trast to the stated position o f the Secretary o f State, caused considerable
stir. Although it was heard in executive session, and was apparently never
published, much of its thrust was leaked to the press. In letters written to
his parents, Sewall indicated satisfaction with his own performance: “ If
Bayard demands my resignation he can have it, but this will only fan the
flames, for the press and public and I believe the [sic] most o f our own
people are with m e”30
The result, of course, was that Sewall was fired. Ironically, the new
Republican administration appointed him a member o f the American
delegation to a conference in Berlin on Samoa, a belated extension of
Bayard’s meeting in Washington in 1887. A further irony is that many ac
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counts o f the Berlin Conference portray it as a culmination o f
Bayard’s policy, at least in its broad outlines.'1 Following the conference,
Sewall went back to Samoa as consul general, where he remained until
1892. His second tour o f duty was much less eventful, although he did
keep a suspicious eye trained on the foreign powers.
Following his resignation from the consular service in 1892, Sewall
renounced his allegiance to the Democratic party, a move triggered by
Cleveland’s withdrawal o f the Hawaiian annexation treaty submitted to
Congress in the closing days o f his predecessor’s administration. For Se
wall the refusal to annex Hawaii was yet another demonstration o f the
Democratic party’s wrong-headed foreign policy. With his change in
partisan loyalty, Harold Sewall actually campaigned against his father,
the Democratic vice-presidential candidate running with William Jen
nings Bryan, during the 1896 campaign.1’ With McKinley’s victory, the
younger Sewall was appointed Minister to Hawaii. He remained in Hon
olulu from 1897 to 1900. When he failed to win appointment as the terri
tory’s new governor following annexation, Sewall returned home to
Bath where he stayed active in state politics and public affairs for the rest
of his life. Although Sewall sought other diplomatic opportunities after

Arthur Sewall, Harold’s father,
was a prominent leader in the
Democratic party, serving in 1896
as William Jennings Bryan’s vicepresidential running mate. In 1892
the younger Sewall renounced his
allegiance to the Democratic
party, and in 1896 he campaigned
against his father.
Photo courtesy Maine Maritime
Museum
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returning to Maine, no significant appointments ever came his way
again. Sewall died in 1924."
It is time to ask about the significance o f this conflict. Were the dif
ferences between Sewall and Bayard simply a result o f Sewall’s character?
Was the policy, as some argued at the time, a result of Sewall simply be
ing too headstrong or impetuous? Or was it, as others claimed, just one
more relatively meaningless partisan squabble?'4
Partisan political considerations were evidently important; Sewall
believed that if Cleveland took a stronger stance on Samoa the president
would enhance his chances for re-election. But after the election Sewall
apparently became involved with Frye, a powerful Republican leader in
Maine and Washington. This, of course, could be interpreted as oppor
tunism— a young man angling for a new appointment with the Republi
cans. But if that were the case, then Sewall sought a Republican appoint
ment on the basis o f a policy position he had staked out and argued
consistently for almost two years. As to Sewall’s impetuosity, the Repub
licans still sent him to the Berlin Conference and back to Samoa, and
later McKinley sent him to Hawaii at a time when the president consid
ered that appointment a key to securing the American presence in the
Pacific." Nor did the disagreement involve fundamental foreign policy

In iS.SH Sewall was dismissed from his post in Samoa by the outgoing Cleveland ad
ministration, but he returned during the following Republican administration for a
second tour of duty in Samoa, where he occupied this office.
Penbody-Essex Museum photo courtesy of the author.
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issues; Bayard, like Sewall, believed that the American presence in Samoa
was important and should be protected. Bayard’s performance at the
Washington Conference in summer 1887 suggests that he was a careful
steward o f American interests in Samoa.36 Furthermore, the long dis
patch sent in 1888 to the American minister to Germany indicates that
Bayard was neither duped nor acquiescent, as Sewall believed. The dis
patch was written in response to accusations by Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck that the anti-German attitude and behavior of American con
sular officials in Apia had caused the trouble in Samoa. After Sewall’s
critical testimony before the Senate subcommittee, Bayard would come
to feel differently about the consul general, but in 1888 he not only de
fended Sewall but went on to charge Germany with the entire responsi
bility for the problems in Samoa.37 Moreover, in the despatch Bayard
painted with a broad brush, making no distinction between the motives
of private German citizens and those operating in official capacity:
The conclusion at which I am forced to arrive from this review of re
cent events in Samoa is that the present unfortunate situation there is
due not to any action on the part of representatives of the United
States, but to the fomentation by interested foreigners of native dissen
sions, and to the desire exhibited in a marked degree by those in charge
of local German interests to obtain personal and commercial advan
tages and political supremacy.38
Bayard was under few illusions regarding German activity in Samoa.
The Secretary o f State was simply more cautious and prudent than was
his younger subordinate. From Sewall’s perspective, the threat of force
would have safeguarded both Samoan independence and American in
terests, and his inability to articulate this point o f view in Washington
was the root of his frustration. Sewall remained enthusiastic about the
prospects for a showdown at Apia, even if it meant war.39
A deeper issue that separated Sewall and Bayard was the fact that the
two men were of different generations. Although it may be common
place to suggest that youth is imprudent while sage countenance comes
with age, the age difference between Sewall and Bayard played out in
precise historical terms. In early 1890, after the Berlin Conference but be
fore returning to Samoa under Republican auspices, Sewall gave a
speech at Bath high school. He spoke about Samoa and the “ humilia
tion” and “dishonor” the Germans inflicted on the American flag.40 He
alluded to other recent international incidents involving foreigners
treating the United States disrespectfully. Taking his moral inspiration
from an earlier generation o f “boys o f Bath High School” who marched
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off to sacrifice in the Civil War, Sewall described “the greatest danger”
facing the American people as a failfure] to maintain a firm and becom
ing attitude towards other nations___We want in proper national pride.
Worthy o f emulation is that spirit of military Europe, which everywhere
unfurls the country’s flag and ever holds it high before the people. Wor
thy of emulation is that spirit which fosters national sensitiveness and
jealousy o f national honor, which teaches the people to resent the slight
est stain upon it as they would upon their own. Such a spirit we need
among us today.41
From Sewall’s perspective, the American people lacked awareness of
the need for “eternal vigilance” and the moral fiber that went with that
vigilance. The country’s geographical isolation permitted the American
people to devote themselves to the development o f their riches. With
this emphasis on domestic growth, however, there lurked a danger. He
cautioned that “as in times of greatest prosperity, we are prone to forget
the giver of all bounty, so now when the burden of government touches
us so lightly, we are unmindful of what we owe it, and to our flag.”42
Sewall’s speech exhibits a remarkable similarity to sentiments ex
pressed by Theodore Roosevelt, a member of that same post-Civil War
generation. Roosevelt believed in the edifying quality o f strenuous or
heroic exertions and voiced his concern that the materialistic preoccu
pations of his fellow citizens heralded a period of decline for the United
States. Sewall lauded the moral qualities o f the Civil War that were ex
hibited by the generation that fought it, as did Roosevelt, whose well
known speech, “ The Strenuous Life,” is a good example. Speaking during
the aftermath of the Spanish American War, amidst the controversy sur
rounding the acquisition o f the new insular empire, the future president
cautioned his audience to avoid the life o f “slothful ease” :
Let us, the children of the men who proved themselves equal to the
mighty days, let us, the men who carried the great Civil War to a tri
umphant conclusion, praise the God of our fathers that the ignoble
counsels of peace were rejected; that the suffering and loss, the black
ness of sorrow and despair, were unflinchingly faced, and the years of
strife endured; for in the end the slave was freed, the Union restored,
and the mighty American republic placed once more as a helmeted
queen among nations.
We of this generation do not have to face a task such as that our fa
thers faced, but we have our task, and woe to us if we fail to perform
them! . . . If we are to be a really great people, we must strive in good
faith to play a great part in the world.43
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In 1892, at the height o f a diplomatic crisis with Chile, Sewall was ready
to resign from the consular service and to join the army and the pending
fray. Several years later, Roosevelt resigned his position as Assistant Sec
retary o f the Navy and went off to Cuba to fight. Sewall, who was then
Minister to Hawaii, was clearly eager for war with Spain. He wrote to his
cousin, a partner in the family shipping business, that he thought it
would be extremely difficult for the American people to bring them
selves to war, and hoped “that AS & Co. have not joined the ‘peace at any
price’ crowd. You will never feel right about it afterwards if you have.” He
lamented his isolation from events and desired to be closer to the action,
either militarily or diplomatically.4''
In 1894, the year Sewall switched political parties and began giving
speeches on behalf o f the Republicans, Roosevelt wrote to his friend
Henry Cabot Lodge, “ I thought Sewall’s [speech] more than good. It
fired m y blood to read it.”45 Sewall and Roosevelt had similar back
grounds. Both were born into wealthy and influential families that took
some interest in public affairs, and they attended Harvard College at
about the same time.46 They were o f a generation born just before the
Civil War and grew up in a period dominated by that conflict. Sewall’s
1890 speech, with the reference to the Bath boys marching off to battle, is
a good example of that phenomenon. Sewall and Roosevelt grew up in
the shadow o f that cataclysmic event, but neither had participated in it
nor had to deal with the compelling issues that it raised. And that, of
course, divided them from the political establishment o f Thomas
Bayard’s generation.
It is impossible to argue that the stand one took on the foreign pol
icy issues o f the day was simply attributable to age. Yet, there may be sug
gestive patterns along these lines. Robert Beisner, for example, noted
that the anti-imperialists o f the 1890s tended to be quite old. David Don
ald argued that the generational experiences o f those who fought for the
Confederacy might provide important clues to the origins o f the Jim
Crow Laws.47
A number o f historical works have attempted to make the case that
the Civil War had a significant impact on the intellectual climate and
culture o f post-bellum society. Historians suggest that the patrician
class, in particular, was profoundly affected. The glorification o f the
martial virtues and an accompanying disdain for the complacent mate
rialism o f the Gilded Age seemed to have been a common reaction by
members o f this group.48 Perhaps growing up as a member o f the old
elite without having participated in the conflict inclined one to a more
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bellicose stance in foreign affairs. This attitude seemed morally equiva
lent to the hard choices made by the previous generation which went off
to fight.
Sewall looked for an opportunity to demonstrate the kind o f
courage, moral fiber, and sacrifice that he attributed to those who left
Bath to fight in the Civil War. Almost a decade and a half after the speech
he gave at his high school, Sewall still focused on the Civil War as the
moral backdrop to the circumstances that faced the American people.
Having apparently made a study of the Civil War regiments recruited
from Maine, Sewall gave another speech in Bath on Memorial Day 1904,
and said that it was both an honor and an embarrassment to address the
dwindling ranks of Civil War veterans,
because no one of the generation to which I belong, no one of any gen
eration since the war, can approach the drama of the stupendous
struggle without an over-whelming sense of his own unworthiness.
And no one can try to lift its curtain, or describe the scenes behind it
without a sense of temerity that tempts him to silence.49
He discussed the inspiring example of a Bath hero of the Civil War, Gen
eral Thomas W. Hyde, who was only twenty when he recruited a regi
ment and went off to fight, and who rose quickly through the ranks by
virtue o f his daring exploits. Clearly in awe of the valor demonstrated by
Hyde, who received the Medal o f Honor for his role at Antietam, Sewall
noted that the General had written a book in 1894 about the war.50 As
Sewall went on to tell his listeners, Roosevelt had read the book and
wrote to Hyde: “ To think that we o f this generation may never have a
chance to prove ourselves worthy of the generation before us.”51 Sewall
concluded his speech that day by commenting that “the danger is not in
any extravagant eulogy of the soldier or o f war, or the flag or the strenu
ous life, but rather that in these comfortable times we may exalt too
much the fruits of peace and forget those who have made these possi
ble.” 52
It seems clear that for some members of the post-Civil War genera
tion the moral example o f the great American cataclysm was a recurrent
issue. The Civil War challenged individuals such as Sewall and Roosevelt
by providing a poignant example o f moral choice and self-sacrifice that
stood in contrast with the complacency around them. The unworthiness
that Sewall mentioned in the later speech was born from not having
been tested in a dramatic way. Perhaps the fear of not passing the test,
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were it to come along, provoked a truculent demeanor when the country
appeared challenged from abroad. It would seem, then, that personal or
psychological factors relating to the post-Civil War generation need fur
ther exploration in the ongoing debate regarding the evolution of the
American empire in the late nineteenth century.53
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